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1 Introduction
Consider a setting where agents with different priors compete to predict a variable y.
Agents use a (possibly misspecified) statistical model that treats y as a linear function
of a number of possible covariates {xi}i∈{1,...,k} plus a noise term, i.e., y =
∑
βixi + .
For example, y could be a country’s GDP growth, which agents are trying to predict
using a long list of variables x. Both the βi’s and the variance of  are potentially
unknown. Agents share the same quadratic loss function about their prediction, but
use different models : different subsets of covariates as relevant to the prediction. In
the GDP example, some may believe that relevant factors include education level and
net trade surplus; others may also consider monetary supply and climate change data.
All agents are Bayesian and update their prior after observing a common dataset: n
draws of y and x from the unknown data generating process.
We ask the following question: What are the characteristics of the model of the
agent that, after observing the data, has the highest subjective confidence in its pre-
dictive ability, i.e., has the lowest posterior expected loss?
We show that the answer depends both on the size of the dataset n and on the
model dimension of the agent, i.e., how many variables are considered. With small
samples the most confident agent uses a model that is small-dimensional, with a
smaller number of variables relative to the true data generating process and, perhaps,
including covariates that have no explanatory power. Instead, with large samples the
most confident agent uses a large-dimensional model that possibly includes irrelevant
variables, but never excludes relevant ones.
There are many competitive situations in which subjective confidence is a key
driving force and prominence is acquired by the most confident agents. For example,
consider a second-price auction to acquire a productive asset whose value depends
on the agent’s ability to predict a given variable using a set of covariates: the asset
could be ad-spaces on an online platform, the value of which depends on the sellers’
ability to infer customers’ preferences using observable characteristics; or it could be
a company, whose future value depends on how accurately the new owner is able to
predict market conditions. All bidders observe the same data, but may use different
variables to make predictions, as they may have different priors. All else equal, the
auction is won by the agent who is most confident in her predictive ability, according
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to her own posterior. More generally, our results are useful to characterize who
emerges in competitive situations in which a leading position is taken by those who
are most subjectively confident in their predictive ability, e.g., political or corporate
competition.
There is a trivial reason why agents with simpler models may be more confident:
their models may contain less uncertainty about the world. The most extreme case is
when a subject is dogmatic: she has a—right or wrong—deterministic model. That
subject would believe she has perfect predictive ability—and would bid high in the
auction context above. This reason is not what drives our results: as we discuss,
our conclusions hold even if we impose the condition that all agents have the same
confidence level before observing any data. As we will see, our results depend on how
model complexity affects how confidence evolves as agents process new data.
Our results sit within the large and growing body of work in economic theory on
agents with misspecified models (we defer a full discussion of the literature to Section
5). In particular, it can be seen as trying to understand if, or when, competition
selects agents with correctly specified models. Our results may also, at a high level, be
reminiscent of model-selection methods in Econometrics and Machine Learning, with
one big difference: Our results here emerge positively, as the outcome of competition
among different purely-Bayesian decision makers using different models. By contrast,
the model selection literature is motivated normatively by the need to avoid over-
fitting: large-dimensional models may be too flexible and give an illusion of fitting
the data. It proposes and studies techniques to explicitly penalize large-dimensional
models—there is no such penalty in our setting.
Summary of Results and Intuition. Our first result, Lemma 1, characterizes the
expected posterior loss of an agent as a function of their subjective prior and observed
data. We show that this loss can be decomposed as the sum of two components,
which we term: 1) model fit : the agent’s posterior expectation of the variance of the
regression residual, ; and 2) model estimation uncertainty : the degree of uncertainty
that the agent has about the coefficients in her regression model. Crucially, we show
that the latter in turn depends on the model dimension. This implies that while
Bayesian agents use their posteriors to compute the best action and do not care
about the dimension of the model they are using, this very dimension affects their
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confidence in their own predictive ability.
This characterization has two immediate implications, depending on the size of
the dataset. Suppose first that the dataset is very large. Then, the latter component
vanishes: agents will have no uncertainty about their fitted parameters, even if they
are using the wrong model. Expected posterior loss, and thus subjective confidence,
is therefore based solely on model fit. As a result, incorrectly specified models, i.e.,
models which omit an observable that is relevant for prediction, never prevail. At
the same time, we show that larger models, those that contain additional observables
that are irrelevant to the true data generating process (DGP), may continue to win
even asymptotically. Even though these larger models will converge to the properly
calibrated ones, for any finite sample they remain strictly different; we show that their
probability of winning remains strictly above zero even asymptotically. In turns, this
shows that the role of priors does not vanish asymptotically: it continues to affect a
large model’s probability of winning even with infinite data.
Our second set of results pertain to the case of small datasets. Here ‘model
estimation uncertainty’ plays a critical role. We show that the winning agent will
have a model that is of smaller dimension than the true DGP. This is because, while
agents with misspecified models may have a lower model fit, they will also have a
lower model estimation uncertainty—as they have fewer parameters to estimate. In
order to establish these results, we additionally assume that all agents’ priors take the
analytically convenient ‘normal-inverse gamma’ form ( Definition 1). Moreover, to
make the problem interesting and avoid trivial cases, we show that our results holds
even if we assume that, before observing any data, the agents’ priors are such that
all agents have the same predictive ability.
First, we prove that when the dataset consists of a single data point, the winning
model always involves exactly 1 observable (Proposition 1). Deriving more general
results is challenging. Small samples have two features: the dependence on specific
data realizations, and the fact that the prior remains relevant. In our analysis, we
want to preserve the second feature, but circumvent the first—the source of the dif-
ficulty in analytical tractability. To this is end, we use a non-standard asymptotic
framework in which we let the dataset grow but at the same time we make the priors
more dogmatic. This captures the key feature of small samples—the prior plays a
relevant role—while at the same time we apply the Law of Large Numbers. Using
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this approach, we show that indeed small-dimensional models—possibly misspecified
as they use fewer observables than the true DGP—prevail.
These results follow from a simple intuition. Suppose Dr. A and Dr. B are both
trying to predict y using a set of covariates {xi}i∈{1,...,100}. Dr. A believes that only
x1 matters to predict y. Dr. B, instead, considers all 100 covariates. Suppose the
true DGP is such that the best linear predictor of y includes all covariates: thus, Dr.
B has a ‘correct’ model, while Dr. A does not. Suppose that Drs. A and B have the
same prior expected loss. After n data points are revealed, who is more confident?
Suppose first that n is small, e.g. n = 5. Dr. A will believe she has a good
grasp of the data generating process—she is trying to fit only one parameter with 5
data points; her confidence will be high. Dr. B, however, will make little headway in
estimating her model: fitting 100 parameters using 5 observations, her confidence will
be low. Further, since the amount of data is “small,” both agents’ posterior estimates
of the variance of  (σ2 ) are close to their prior. Therefore the competition is mainly
over who believes they have a good grasp of the data generating process—and Dr.
A prevails. Hence even though Dr. A has a misspecified model that omits 99 out of
the 100 relevant variables, and even though the agents’ prior confidence is the same,
when n is small she will nevertheless have higher confidence in her predictive ability.
What happens then as data accumulates? A tradeoff emerges. While Dr. A will
be able to estimate the parameters of her model well, she will also observe that it has
poor fit on the data. After all, she must attribute all the explanatory power of the
variables she omits, x2 . . . x100, to noise, therefore leading her to increase her estimate
of σ2 . Dr. B instead will take longer to estimate the parameters of her model, but she
will be able to fit the data with a lower σ2 . As n grows, however, the second effect
will acquire prominence, and Dr. B will become more confident.
This trade-off is the core of our results. A small number of observations increases
confidence faster for agents with small-dimensional models. It is only as n grows
larger that the confidence of agents with larger-dimensional models may catch up.
Even if the true DGP is large-dimensional, when the dataset is small, agents with
small-dimensional models are thus overconfident about their predictive abilities —
and may thus be the most confident of all.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the for-
mal model and notation; and also characterizes the expected posterior loss of a single
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agent, the foundation of our results. Section 3 collects our main results characterizing
the winning model under competition: Section 3.1 illustrates with a simple simula-
tion, Section 3.2 considers the case when n is large, and Section 3.3 the case of n
small. Section 4 considers some extensions and implications of our results. Section 5
discusses the related literature in further detail and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model and Single Agent Problem
A group of agents is competing to predict a real-valued variable y. There are k real-
valued covariates (or explanatory variables) x ∈ Rk. In this section, we describe the
relationship between y and x postulated by each agent, the data available, and the
agents’ priors. We also characterize her subjective expected posterior loss (henceforth,
posterior loss) conditional on choosing the optimal prediction function (Lemma 1).
The latter plays a crucial role for our results.
Data Generating Process and Data. A true data generating process (DGP),
denoted P, determines the relationship between y and x. Agents do not know P, but
all of them assume a linear relation between y and the covariates x ∈ Rk, i.e.,
y = x′β + , (1)
where |x ∼ N1(0, σ2 ), β ∈ Rk,
that is to say, a homoskedastic linear regression with Gaussian errors.1
For simplicity, we assume that the agents treat the distribution of the covariates
x as known, and denote it by P . We assume throughout that EP [xx′] is a positive
definite matrix and that the random vector x have finite moments of all orders. Let
Θ := Rk × R+, with θ = (β, σ2 ) defining the unknown parameters of interest. Fixing
P , the parameter θ = (β, σ2 ) fully defines the DGP according to agents, which we
1Because covariates in x can be correlated, the linearity assumption only mildly restricts the
models that agents can entertain. For example, if one wished to express the non-linear DGP y =
3
x31√
x5
+ , one can simply define a new observable equal to x
3
1√
x5
. While not all non-linear DGPs can
be expressed this way, especially since we assume finitely many observables, good approximations
can always be achieved. Thus, our framework allows the agents to have a wide family of non-linear
relations as DGP.
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denote by Qθ.
Crucially, Equation (1) represents the agents’ perceived DGP which is allowed to
be misspecified. This means that Qθ is allowed to differ from the true P at every
θ—for example, in the true DGP P, errors may be non-normal or heteroskedastic, or
the conditional expectation need not be linear.
Before making a prediction, agents observe a dataset, denoted Dn, composed of n
i.i.d. draws according to the true DGP, P. We denote the data as Dn = (Y,X) where
Y ∈ Rn and X ∈ Rn×k. We assume that all agents observe the same data: this will
be relevant for our application—as we shall see, in an auction setting this will avoid
winner’s curse type concerns.
Priors. Agents are Bayesians and have a prior pi over the model’s parameters θ =
(β, σ2 ). A key ingredient in our setting, as foreshadowed in the introduction, is that
agents may have different priors, with different supports.
Of particular interest will be the case in which agents consider different explana-
tory variables as relevant for their prediction. The following notation will be useful.
Let {1, 2 . . . , k} label the explanatory variables in x. Denote by J(pi) the set of
variables that an agent with prior pi consider relevant for the prediction problem.
Formally, let pii denote the marginal distribution over βi corresponding to prior pi. If
δ0 denotes a Dirac measure at zero, then
J(pi) := {i ∈ 1, . . . , k : pii(βi) 6= δ0}.
In what follows, we sometimes use simply J ⊆ {1, . . . , k} to refer to a model,
which should be understood as the set of explanatory variables considered to make a
prediction. Lastly, for a given vector β, denote by βJ the subvector consisting solely
of the components in the set J ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, xJ the analogous subvector of x, and
XJ the corresponding submatrix of X.
Actions, Utility, and Optimal Prediction. Agents make a prediction of y given
the covariates x, which formally means that they construct a prediction function f
that maps x into y, i.e., f : Rk → R. Their utility is maximized by minimizing a
standard quadratic loss function, equal to the square of the difference between the
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true y and their forecast f , i.e., −(y − f)2. Denote by L(f, θ) the agent’s loss under
prediction function f if the true DGP is Qθ, i.e.,
L(f, θ) := EQθ [(y − f(x))2]. (2)
If pi is the agent’s prior over θ, and Dn the observed data, then characterizing the
optimal prediction f ∗ is a standard problem. The agent chooses f to minimize,
Epi[L(f, θ)|Dn], that can be rewritten as:
Epi[σ2 |Dn] + EpiEP [(x′β − f(x))2|Dn]. (3)
The first term does not depend on f . The second term involves the average error
incurred in predicting x′β using f(x).2 With standard arguments (i.e., exchanging
the order of integration and taking first order conditions), we can see that the inner
expectation of the second term is minimized by
f ∗(pi,Dn)(x) := x
′ Epi[β|Dn] = x′J(pi)Epi[βJ(pi)|Dn]. (4)
Thus, a Bayesian decision maker with a posterior pi|Dn, model J(pi), and a square
loss function, forecasts y at x as her Bayesian posterior mean of x′β. Again, this is a
standard result.
2.1 Single Agent Posterior Loss
We now turn to characterizing the agent’s posterior loss conditional on her using the
optimal prediction function, denoted by L∗(pi,Dn). This measures how confident each
agent is of her predictive ability, and it will be the central driver of the dynamic of
our competition between agents. Most importantly, the key driving forces behind our
results will already be evident from the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The agent’s posterior expected loss from her Bayes predictor is:
L∗(pi,Dn) = Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
+ Tr (Vpi[βJ |Dn] EP [xJx′J ]) , (5)
2The inner expectation averages over values of x. The outer expectation averages over the values
of β.
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where V(·) is the variance-covariance operator, Tr is the trace operator, and J denotes
the agent’s model J(pi).
This lemma may be reminiscent of the standard decomposition of mean-squared
prediction error in frequentist linear regression models; e.g., Theorem 4.7 in Hansen
(2020). The novelty here is that this is the subjective Bayesian analogue of such a
decomposition, and to our knowledge has not been observed previously.
The lemma shows that the agent’s expected posterior loss L∗(pi,Dn) can be char-
acterized as made of two components. First, the posterior expectation of σ2 . This
is the agent’s estimate of the irreducible noise in the system. We interpret this term
as a measure of model fit, i.e., how well is the agent’s model fitting existing data,
because the agent must ascribe all unexplained variation to noise.
The second term, Tr (Vpi[β|Dn] EP [xx′]), is the trace of the variance-covariance
matrix of the coefficients of the model (adjusted by EP [xx′]). This is a measure of
how uncertain is the agent of her estimation of her model— thus capturing what we
can call the model estimation uncertainty faced by the agent according to her own
prior. For an intuition, consider the simpler case in which observables are independent
and have the same variance. Then, the second term reduces to Tr (Vpi[β|Dn]), i.e.,∑k
i=1Vpi[βi|Dn]. In this case the second part of the loss function is simply the sum of
the variances of the parameters β, indeed a measure of model estimation uncertainty.
The exact formula in (5) extends this to cover the case of observables with a general
variance-covariance matrix. In the next section we will show that this decomposition
has immediate implications on which model leads to the highest subjective confidence.
3 Competing Models
We assume that agents compete through a mechanism that selects the agent with the
lowest posterior expected loss given her own subjective prior. Our analysis applies to
any mechanism that leads to this selection. A simple example discussed in the intro-
duction is that of a second-price auction, where the dominant strategy equilibrium
results in this type of selection; as these are standard arguments, we discuss them in
details in Appendix A.1.
Central in our characterization of the agent with the lowest expected posterior
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loss is Lemma 1. Applying it, we immediately derive that in finite samples this will
be the agent with the prior such that
min
pi
Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Model Fit
+Tr (Vpi[βJ |Dn] EP [xJx′J ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Model Estimation Uncertainty
.
over the collection of priors of agents in the population. Crucially, pi is the prior that
achieves the best trade-off between model fit and model estimation uncertainty.
This characterization has two immediate implications, depending on the size of
the dataset.
When n is large, the model estimation uncertainty component of the posterior loss
vanishes: each agent, even those with a ‘wrong’ model, will reduce the uncertainty
about the parameters to zero. All that matters is the model fit. Then, models that
exclude relevant variables necessarily have higher expected loss: they must estimate a
higher σ2 to account for the variation that they are disregarding. Therefore, with large
data agents whose models are misspecified by excluding relevant variables will not
win our competition. How about agents who consider more variables than necessary?
With large data, their model fit will be the same as the true model. In what may be
less intuitive, we show that agents who use models that are larger than the true one
may win with probabilities bounded away from zero; and these are non-negative, and
potentially even close to one, even asymptotically as data grows large. That implies
that agents’ prior continue to affect the model competition even with infinite data;
the initial choice of prior affects the model competition, even in large samples.
When n is small, however, model estimation uncertainty does not vanish, and a
central role is played by its tradeoff with model fit. The first observation is that model
estimation uncertainty is affected by model dimension: it will be necessarily lower for
lower-dimensional models, because agents have fewer parameters to fit. This means
that small-dimensional models may have an advantage, and the winning agent may
then be one with a model that is misspecified and of smaller dimension than the
true DGP. This holds not because smaller-dimensional models have more confidence
to begin with—our results holds even if we assume that agents start with the same
expected loss with no data. Instead, what happens is that when the data revealed is
(relatively) small, the expected loss decreases faster for agents with small-dimensional
model: they will learn their (fewer) parameters faster. Thus, agents who hold models
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that are misspecified in that they exclude relevant variable may end up being more
confident in their predictive ability. The example discussed in the introduction (of Dr.
A and B) may provide further intuition. To recap, ceteris paribus, trying to estimate
more parameters from the same amount data will result in more model uncertainty,
i.e., less concentrated posteriors. This uncertainty will therefore be reflected in the
agent’s expected loss.
In what follows, we first illustrate these dynamics in a simple simulation; we then
move to discussing the results for the case of large n, which can be derived under
very general conditions. When n is small, while the intuition above holds, obtaining
a precise characterization of the winning model is more difficult. We assume that
the agents have what we call Normal-Inverse Gamma priors, conjugate priors for the
Normal linear regression model. We also normalize the priors so that, absent data,
all agents are equally confident.
3.1 First Look: Numerical Simulation
Before we dive into formal results, we illustrate them via a simple simulation. We use
the following priors both the simulations and to establish the small-sample results
(Section 3.3). The large-sample results (Section 3.2) do not require this assumption.
Definition 1. We say that the agent’s prior pi has Normal-Inverse Gamma form with
hyperparameters (γ, a0, b0) if
βJ(pi)|σ2 ∼ N|J(pi)|
(
0,
σ2
γ|J(pi)|I|J(pi)|
)
σ2 ∼ Inv-Gamma(a0, b0).
where NJ(µ,Σ) refers to the J-dimensional multivariate normal distribution with
mean µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ, and Inv-Gamma(a0, b0) refers to the In-
verse Gamma distribution with parameters a0 and b0.
We make this assumption purely for tractability: these are conjugate priors for
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the linear regression model, and the associated posteriors are amenable to analysis.3
Note that the priors are such that all agents have the same Inverse Gamma prior
distribution over the distribution of the residuals, while the prior variance over the
regression coefficients is scaled down with the number of regressors in the agent’s
model. These priors are therefore, by construction, normalized so that they all have
the same expected loss before data, i.e., for all pi, pi′, L∗(pi, ∅) = L∗(pi′, ∅). This implies
that, without data, all subjects have the same confidence in their model, and any
difference in confidence is due to different reactions to the data. As mentioned in the
introduction, we consider this normalization solely to illustrate that our results in
which smaller models may prevail are not due to different confidence to begin with,
but rather to different ways in which the confidence evolves with new data.
Figure 1 shows simulation results in a setting where there are six observables in
the dataset, {x1, . . . , x6}, of which only the first five are relevant for prediction in
the true DGP, i.e. y =
∑5
i=1 βixi + . There are 63 agents, one for each non-empty
subset of {x1, . . . , x6}, all with Normal-Inverse Gamma priors with the same shared
hyperparameters. By construction, therefore, 61 of these agents have an incorrect
model (i.e., ignore at least one variable that is relevant for prediction in their own
model), one agent has the exactly correct model, and one agent has a larger model
than the truth.
We simulate datasets of sizes n = 1 to 50, and plot the frequency of the size of
the model of the agent with the lowest posterior expected loss upon observing that
dataset. Two main features clearly emerge. First, when n is small, small-dimensional
models prevail: when n = 1, the winner is a small model, indeed a model that we
know to be misspecified; as n grows, we have ‘waves’ of larger, but still misspecified
models becoming more prominent. Second, as n grows large, the true model wins
more often. However, also the larger model, that includes the redundant variable x6,
continues to win, with relative frequencies that appear to converge to a steady state.
The results below explain the theoretical basis of these findings.
3In particular, algebra shows that:
Epi[σ2 |Dn] =
2b0
n +
1
n minβ∈R|J(pi)|(y −XJ(pi)β)′(y −XJ(pi)β) + (γ|J(pi)|) ||β||2
2a0
n + 1− 2n
, (6)
Vpi[βJ(pi)|Dn] = Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
(X ′J(pi)XJ(pi) + (γ|J(pi)|)I|J(pi)|)−1. (7)
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Figure 1: Winning rates for different models with Normal Inverse-Gamma priors and
shared hyperparameters (a0, b0, γ) = (2, 1, 0.001) on 5, 000 simulated datasets of size
n = 1 to 50. 6 Covariates are distributed x ∼ N(0, I6). True d.g.p only depends on
covariates 1–5, (β1 . . . β5) ∼ N(0, I5), β6 = 0.
3.2 The winner with large n
We characterize the winner for large n under some mildly technical regularity as-
sumptions about the priors of the agents and conditions on the true unknown DGP,
P. Roughly speaking, these assumptions jointly guarantee that the posteriors of the
agents are well-behaved in the limit (i.e., appropriate central limit theorems apply,
summary statistics of the posterior distribution concentrate appropriately fast etc),
despite them being misspecified (i.e., the true DGP is not in the support of the prior).
To assist the reader we take a slightly unorthodox approach: in the body of the paper,
we present our results under assumptions that are stronger than needed but (much)
easier to parse. In the Appendix 1 we prove that our results continue to hold under
much weaker conditions.
Assumption 1. Each agent has a prior over θ characterized by a smooth and strictly
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positive probability density function pi(·) over (βJ(pi)′, σ2 )′ ∈ R|J(pi)| × R+.4
Assumption 1 posits that agents’ priors over the βi’s are either degenerate at 0
(i.e., the agent views that covariate as not relevant for prediction), or to have full
support on the reals. In the latter case, it requires a density to exist and to be
smooth. Assumption 1 also precludes degenerate priors on σ2 .5
Next, we impose assumptions on the true data generating process P.
Assumption 2. The true data generating process P is a Gaussian linear regression
model as specified in (1); that is, there exists parameters θ0 := (β0, σ20) such that
Qθ0 = P.
Assumption 2 posits that while agents may have misspecified models, this is only
in the form of omitting relevant variables. Again, our results hold under more general
conditions (see Assumption 4 in Appendix 2). In particular, our results continue to
obtain when the true DGP is different from (1), but it is well-behaved enough that
the posterior distributions of the misspecified Bayesian agents become tight around
Maximum Likelihood estimators in large samples.6 For example, the distribution of
errors in the true DGP may be heteroskedastic or non-normal with thin-enough tails,
the distribution on covariates P may be misspecified as long as it has finite second
moments, and the true data generating process may not even be linear.
Finally, a little more notation will be useful. Given the vector β0 ∈ Rk as above,
J0 is the set of indices of the coordinates of β0 that are nonzero, i.e.,
J0 := {κ|βκ 6= 0}.
We remind the reader that J(pi) denotes the coordinates of β for which the prior pi is
not degenerate at 0.
Theorem 1. Let Π be a finite collection of agents’ priors that satisfy Assumption
1. Suppose the true data generating process P satisfies Assumption 2 with associated
4By definition, the prior of agent j for any βκ, κ /∈ J , is degenerate at 0.
5Assumption 3 in the appendix provides a weaker version of Assumption 1 by relaxing the number
of higher order derivatives required from pi.
6In particular, we invoke for the Bernstein-Von Mises theorem for misspecified parametric models
of Kleijn and Van der Vaart (2012) and the posterior expansions of Kass et al. (1990) based on
Laplace’s method. These results can be thought of as modern and richer versions of the classical
results concerning posterior distributions of misspecified models in Berk (1970).
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parameters (β0, σ20). If Π contains a prior pi0 such that J0 ⊆ J(pi0), then
lim
n→∞
P
(
∃pi ∈ argmin
pi∈Π
L∗(pi,Dn) s.t J0 ⊆ J(pi)
)
= 1.
Moreover, for any pi for which J0 ⊂ J(pi)
lim
n→∞
P
(
L∗(pi,Dn) < L∗(pi0, Dn)
) ∈ (0, 1].
Theorem 1 has two main takeaways. The first part tells us that some model which
is (weakly) larger than the true model—possibly containing explanatory variables
that are irrelevant for prediction, but never excluding any relevant variable—will win
the competition with probability approaching one as the sample size grows large. It
follows that a model which excludes a relevant variable never wins in the limit. The
second part shows that any model larger than the true one defeats the latter with a
probability that is strictly positive even asymptotically.
The first result is somewhat intuitive. By Lemma 1, we can decompose posterior
loss into two terms: expected variance of the noise and model estimation uncertainty.
We show that the latter converges to zero for all agents by invoking the Bernstein
Von-Mises theorem for misspecified models. The former term will instead differ:
agents who rule out an observable that is relevant for prediction must attribute its
explanatory power to noise. As n grows large, their posterior expectation of the
variance of the noise term will be necessarily larger, and thus confidence lower, than
that of agents with the true model.
But what about agents whose model is larger than the true model? This part,
covered by the second part of the theorem, is slightly more subtle. After all, this
agent will also eventually learn the true data generating process: that is, her beliefs
about the β’s associated to redundant variables must converge to zero. But how will
the confidence compare? For any fixed n, the agent with more observables in her
model will have a less concentrated posterior on β. On the other hand, she will also
have slightly smaller posterior expectation of the variance of the noise term: she will
mistakenly attribute some explanatory power to these superfluous observables. Which
of these two effects dominate, both of which can be shown to be OP( 1n), determines
the likelihood of winning. From a technical perspective, the comparison of these
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vanishingly small terms is based on an asymptotic expansion for the posterior mean
of the variance parameter in the linear regression model based on the general results
in Kass et al. (1990). This is not a textbook result, and so we provide details in the
appendix. In a nutshell, Lemma 2 in the Supplementary Materials shows that the
model fit term equals
σ
∧2(pi)− 2σ
∧4(pi)
n
{(
∂pi
∂σ2
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
· 1
pi(θ
∧
(pi))
}
− σ∧2(pi) |J(pi)|+ 4
n
+OP
(
1
n2
)
,
where hats denote the Maximum Likelihood estimator of the model’s parameters
by an agent that only considers the explanatory variables in J(pi). Similarly, when
Assumption 2 is satisfied the model uncertainty term equals
|J(pi)|
n
+ oP
(
1
n
)
.
The second part of Theorem 1 uses these expansions to show that the probability of
the larger model winning is bounded away from zero, even in the limit. In fact, it
is easy to construct examples in which the probability of a larger model beating the
true one can be made arbitrarily close to one even in the limit.7
3.3 The winner with n ‘small’
We are now ready to discuss the properties of the winner model when the number of
observations n is relatively small. We have see an intuition of how Lemma 1 already
suggested that there may be advantages given to smaller-dimensional models, and
the simulation results showed that when data is scarce, the winner may indeed be a
model smaller-dimensional than the true DGP. We will now provide additional formal
results to strengthen this understanding,.
In this subsection, we assume that agents have Normal-Inverse Gamma priors
with shared hyperparameters as in Definition 1. As we discussed, this ensures that
all agents have the same prior expected loss before data. Differences in posterior
7Suppose for example that priors are of the Normal-Inverse Gamma form, as in Definition 1, but
allow them to have different parameters (api, bpi). Algebra shows that if bpi is large enough (i.e., the
variance of the prior over σ2 is large enough), then the probability that the larger model defeats a
smaller one can become arbitrarily close to 1 even in the limit.
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expected loss arise only from the fact that the posterior evolves differently for models
of different sizes given the same model. In addition, in some cases we also assume
that covariates are i.i.d., i.e., EP [x′x] = Ik.
The winner with 1 data point. We start with an extreme but stark result for
the case in which agents observe only one datapoint.
Proposition 1. Suppose all agents have Normal-Inverse Gamma priors with shared
hyper-parameters (a0, b0, γ). Suppose that all agents believe the joint distribution of the
covariates is such that EP [x′x] = Ik. Suppose that for every single covariate model,
i.e. every J such that |J | = 1, there is an agent with that model. If these agents
compete after seeing a dataset which consists of a single observation, i.e. n = 1, then
the winner is always one of these agents with a single variable model, regardless of
which other models are represented.
Note that this result holds independently of the true DGP: even when that is
high-dimensional, with only one data-point it is always a 1-dimensional model to
win. Numerical simulations suggest that a generalization of this result appears to
hold: with n observations the winner is n-dimensional or smaller. We were not able
to formalize such an observation, as in finite samples the expressions for Epi[σ2 |Dn]
and Tr(Vpi[β|Dn])) are algebraically less tractable even with the specific form of priors
we assume: the reason is that they depend on the inverse of a matrix of specific data
realizations, which is hard to operate with.
A novel approach for small n analysis. We now suggest a novel way of ap-
proaching the problem of small sample analysis that allows us to obtain further re-
sults despite the analytical limitations discussed above. This general approach may
be of independent interest.
The initial observation is that small samples appear to be distinct from large ones
for two basic properties: i) that the prior remains relevant instead of being partially
‘washed away’ by the data; and ii) that specific data realizations matter, instead of
only the population average mattering. It is the latter characteristic that leads to the
analytical difficulties we encountered above. In large samples these issues do not arise
because laws of large numbers can be invoked, circumventing the analytical concerns
as they allow us to replace specific observation with population averages.
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But what if we find a way to maintain the first property of small samples—that the
prior still matters—while dispensing with the second, problematic one—that specific
realizations matter? To do this, we let n grow to infinity, thus allowing us to use
the law of large numbers, but at the same time vary the hyperparameters of priors
to simultaneously make them become more and more precise, at a pace such that
they maintain their relevance. Such ‘alternative asymptotics’ frameworks have been
used to study different inference problems in econometrics.8 The next result uses
this approach to show that as long as the prior remains sufficiently relevant, smaller
models have an advantage.
Theorem 2. Suppose all the agents have Normal-Inverse Gamma prior with shared
hyper-parameters (ao, bn, γ), where bn ∈ ω (n2).9 Suppose the DGP P satisfies As-
sumption 2, with parameter θ0 := (β0, σ20). Let J0 denote the associated true model
for β0 and suppose there exists at least one agent with prior pi such that |J(pi)| < J0.
Then
lim
n→∞
P
(
∃pi ∈ argmin
pi∈Π
L∗(pi,Dn) s.t |J(pi)| < |J0|
)
= 1
In words, this result shows that if the prior concentrates fast enough, the results
are the converse of the large data case (i.e., Theorem 1): models that are larger-
dimensional than the true DGP never win, and instead the winner is always smaller-
dimensional than the truth.
4 Extensions and Implications
We conclude our formal analysis with a discussion of two variants of our model, both
of which provide the same stark prediction of the “small data” world: agents with
“simple” models always win. Indeed, both of these strengthen our small data results.
Known Variance. What happens when the variance σ2 of the noise-term  is
commonly known among the agents? This is an extreme special case of our analysis
8See the local-to-zero asymptotics of Staiger and Stock (1997) for the analysis of instrumental
variable regression with a weak instrument, the local-to-unity framework of Phillips (1987) for the
analysis of inference in a autoregressive model with autocorrelation close to 1.
9Roughly, that bn asymptotically grows at a rate strictly faster than n2.
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above; it may be realistic in some situations, but not in others.10
Proposition 2. Suppose agents have Normal priors on β with shared hyper-parameter
γ . Fix a prior pi with |J(pi)| = k. For any k′ < k, and any dataset Dn for n > 0, there
exists a prior pi′ such that J(pi′) ⊆ J(pi) with |J(pi′)| = k′ and such that L∗(pi′, Dn) <
L∗(pi,Dn).
In short, for any model J(pi), and any dataset of any size, some smaller model
with a subset of the explanatory variables will have a lower posterior loss.
Bidding Before seeing the data. A different extension is to a setting where
agents know that they will see exactly n data points, but compare expected confidence
before they view the data: this is the case, for example, when agents have to submit
a bid before seeing the data, but know that they will see n data points before making
their prediction. Put differently, we study the expectation before seeing the data of
the expected loss after n datapoints.11 This situation may be not unusual in reality,
as often new data is revealed after bidding but before predictions needs to be made.
A stark result holds in this case: smaller models always win. In fact, in this case
the result is even stronger than previous ones, as we explain below.
Proposition 3. Suppose agents have Normal Inverse-Gamma priors with shared
hyper-parameters (a0, b0, γ), and that γ = 0. Suppose further that x ∼ Nk(0, Ik)
independently of . Fix a prior pi. For any prior pi′, such that |J(pi′)| < |J(pi)|, we
have that
Em(pi′)[L∗(pi′, Dn)] < Em(pi)[L∗(pi,Dn)],
whenever n > |J(pi)| + 1. Here the outer expectation is taken over the agents’
‘marginal’ distribution of the data m(pi) :=
∫
qθ(Dn)pi(θ)dθ.12
10Indeed, there is an aspect that makes this assumption problematic in some environments. When
variance is not uncertain, agents with incorrect models of the world will, as data accrues, observe
that their model has an empirical error higher than the (known) σ2, because the model disregards
some observables relevant for prediction. For n large, this disparity in the empirical error and the
(known) σ2 should lead them to question their underlying model. However, as is standard with
Bayesians with dogmatic beliefs (here they have degenerate beliefs on σ2) they do not. When the
dataset is not too large, however, such issues will not arise.
11Note that since different agents have different beliefs about the data generating process, they
take expectations with respect to different probability distributions over the space of datasets Dn.
12Hence, the expression Em(pi′)[L∗(pi′, Dn)] is the Bayes risk of the Bayes Predictor. See Equation
1.14 in Chapter 1.6 in Ferguson (1967).
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Proposition 3 shows that when confidence is computed before data is realized, not
only smaller models ‘beat’ the correctly specified one, but this holds for any smaller
model, not just some of the smaller models, as was the case in some of the previous
results; moreover, this holds for any size of the dataset n.
For an intuition, consider again the decomposition of posterior loss obtained
through Lemma 1. Depending on the realized Dn, the first term, model fit, can
be larger or smaller than the prior expectation of it before data is realized. Indeed,
this is the complicating factor in the analyses of Propositions 1 and 2. However,
here, we take expectation over all possible datasets, and the first term reduces to its
prior expectation. So we can focus only on the second term, model estimation uncer-
tainty. But then, as in previous results, the residual model uncertainty is smaller in
expectation for smaller models. Proposition 3 follows.
Connection with the Akaike information criterion. A different way to under-
stand our results is to relate the model selection induced by competing models to the
Akaike Information Criterion, a well-studied model selection criterion in Econometrics
and Statistics. In what follows, we illustrate that the loss function of an agent with
Normal-Inverse Gamma prior is “close” to the AIC for the linear regression model.
Definition 2 (Akaike Information Criterion). Given a dataset Dn = (y,X) with
n data points and k possible covariates, the Akaike information criterion for linear
regression evaluates a model based on XJ as:
LAkaike(J, n,Dn) = ln σ
∧2(J, n,Dn) +
2|J |
n
,
where σ
∧2(J, n,Dn) =
1
n
min
β∈R|J|
(y −XJβ)′(y −XJβ).
In words, consider a model J with |J | observables. The expression σ∧2(J, n,Dn) is
the OLS estimator of the residual variance based on a model with covariates XJ in
the dataset Dn with n observations. As is well understood, selecting a model with
a lower estimated variance may not favor the model with the best out of sample
performance. This is because selecting based on average residuals favors models
that have more covariates (i.e., regressions which “overfit” the data). The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) compensates for this by adding a penalty term equal to
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2|J |
n
, i.e., twice the ratio of the number of covariates in the model and the number
of data points. Algebra shows that if agents have an uninformative Normal-Inverse
Gamma prior (γ = 0), then the posterior loss is approximately equal to
ln
(
σ
∧2(J, n,Dn)
)
+ ln
(
1 +
1
n
Tr
((
X ′JXJ
n
)−1
Ep[xJx′J ]
))
.
Thus, if the sample size is large and the agents’ distribution of covariates is well-
specified, the posterior loss of an agent with prior pi will be approximately equal to
the Akaike Information criterion (with a penalty of |J |/n instead of 2|J |/n).
The prevalence of larger models in the model competition can then associated
to the ‘conservativeness’ of the Akaike Criterion for model selection. Our Theorem
3, however, makes it clear that the relation is only qualitative: larger models will
indeed prevail in large samples, but the probability of a larger model being selected
will continue to be affected by the prior.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that the foundations of the AIC are normative: the
criterion was proposed as a way to select a model that avoids overfitting. Conversely,
our analyis provides a positive foundation for the AIC: we study the outcomes when
Bayesian agents compete in a way that selects the agent with the lowest posterior
expected loss.
5 Related Literature
A large literature has studied models of model misspecification in individual decision-
making, with famous examples like overconfidence and correlation neglect. A few
recent theoretical contributions to this enormous literature include Heidhues et al.
(2018) and Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), to which we refer for further references.
In misspecified learning settings, “feedback loops” between the agents’ misspecified
beliefs and the action they take add further technical challenges— see e.g. Fudenberg
et al. (2017), Fudenberg et al. (2020), Heidhues et al. (2020).
Recent works have studied the implications of agents with misspecified models in
various strategic settings. For instance, Bohren (2016), Bohren and Hauser (2017),
Frick et al. (2019b) and Frick et al. (2019a) study social learning when agents have
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misspecified models that cause them to misinterpret other agents’ actions. Mailath
and Samuelson (2019) study a stylized prediction market where Bayesian agents have
different models of the world (defined there as different partitions of a common state
space), and discuss the possibility of information aggregation.
In strategic settings, Esponda and Pouzo (2016) defines a learning-based solution
concept (‘Berk-Nash Equilibrium’) for games in which agents’ beliefs are misspecified.
More broadly, solution concepts have been posited for settings where agents suffer
from some sort of misspecification, including well-known examples like analogy-based
equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) and cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005).
There are several works that consider outcomes when some agents behave in a
way that can be construed as coming from a misspecified model. For instance in
Spiegler (2006) or Spiegler (2013) society misunderstands the relationship between
outcomes and the actions of strategic agents, which affects the actions the latter take
in equilibrium and resulting outcomes (in the former, in the context of a market for
quacks, in the latter with implications to the reforms taken by a politican). Levy et al.
(2019) study a dynamic model of political competition where agents have different
(misspecified) models of the world, and use this model to provide a foundation for
the recurrence of populism. Liang (2018) studies outcomes in games of incomplete
information where agents behave like statisticians and have limited information.13
A novel approach to modeling misspecification in economic theory is the directed
acyclic graph approach; see Pearl (2009). This is exploited in a single person decision
framework in Spiegler (2016), which studies a single decision maker with a misspecified
causal model and large amounts of data. The paper shows that the decision maker
may evaluate actions differently than their long-run frequencies, and exhibit artifacts
such as “reverse causation” and coarse decision making. This approach is then used
in Eliaz and Spiegler (2018), which proposes a model of competing narratives. A
narrative is a causal model that maps actions into consequences, including other
random, unrelated variables. An equilibrium notion is defined, and the paper studies
the distribution of narratives that obtains in equilibrium.
Finally, the understanding that agents should be cognizant that their models
13There is a larger literature which studies the outcomes when agents are modeled as statisticians
or machine learners, e.g., Al-Najjar (2009), Al-Najjar and Pai (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2016) and
Cherry and Salant (2018).
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may be misspecified has also led to new approaches in mechanism design, where
the designer accounts for misspecification in various ways. The literature on robust
mechanism design (beginning with the seminal Bergemann and Morris 2005) provides
foundations for using stronger solution concepts. Madarász and Prat (2017) shows
that an optimal mechanism may perform very poorly if the planner’s model is even
slightly misspecified, and identifies a class of near optimal mechanisms that degrade
gracefully. Works such as Chassang (2013) and Carroll (2015) develop optimal ‘robust’
contracts in general settings and contrast to classical optimal contracting.
Since one natural application of our model is an auction, our results are related
to Atakan and Ekmekci (2014), who consider the competitive sale of assets whose
value depends on how they are utilized.14 The successful bidder chooses an action
that determines, together with the state of the world, the payoff generated by the
asset. They focus on a setting where bidders have a common prior but observe
private signals. Their main result is the possibility of (complete) failure of information
aggregation. Our results are similar in that in our applications as well the value of
the object depends on an action taken by the agent. However, our paper considers
a complementary environment where all bidders observe the same information but
they have different priors. Information aggregation is ruled out by assumption, and
our key theme is model selection.
We assume that agents have different priors and are fully aware they have different
priors: that is to say our agents agree to disagree. This assumption has been used
in economic theory at least since Harrison and Kreps (1978). We refer the reader to
Morris (1995) for a discussion of the common and heterogeneous prior traditions in
economic theory. Heterogenous priors have been used in a number of applications in
bargaining (Yildiz, 2003), trade (Morris, 1994), financial markets (Scheinkman and
Xiong, 2003; Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2015) and more.
Relation to Model Selection. As we mentioned in the Introduction, there is
a large body of literature in Statistics, Econometrics, and Machine Learning that
studies model selection methods and provides normative foundations. That litera-
ture is too vast to comprehensively cite here; we refer the reader to Claeskens and
Hjort (2008) and Burnham and Anderson (2003) for textbook overviews. Popular
14Bond and Eraslan (2010) study a trading environment with a similar feature.
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approaches include, for example, the Cp criterion of Mallows (1973), the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC) of Akaike (1974), and the Bayes Information Criterion
(BIC) of Schwarz (1978). We showed that there exists a connection between our
large data results and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) introduced in Akaike
(1974) , in particular, to the asymptotic properties of the AIC characterized in the
seminal paper of Nishii (1984).
While some of our asymptotic results are reminiscent of the model selection liter-
ature, there are three important differences. First, the aims of this literature are very
different to ours. Ours is a positive approach of studying which model emerges from a
competition between Bayesian agents with misspecified models. The approach in the
model-selection literature is instead normative: various methods of model-selection
are proposed and studied with a view to avoiding over-fitting and/or selecting ‘good’
models according to some metric. The results we are aware of broadly speak to the
asymptotic efficiency of these techniques. Second, not only our results are derived
from a completely different model, but they are also proven with different techniques.
Third, the connection is limited to the large-data result. We are also not aware of
any analogs to our small-sample results in the model selection literature.
We also use techniques and approaches from the statistics and econometrics lit-
erature. The proof of Theorem 2 uses ‘non-standard asymptotics’ that allow for the
parameters of a statistical model to be indexed by the sample size have been used
extensively in econometrics. The typical goal of an alternative asymptotic frame-
work is to provide better approximations to finite-sample distributions of estimators,
tests, and confidence intervals, while exploiting Laws of Large Numbers and Cen-
tral Limit Theorems. For example, the local-to-unity asymptotics of Phillips (1987)
studies auto-regressive models that are close to being nonstationary; the local-to-
zero asymptotics of Staiger and Stock (1997) studies Instrumental Variables models
that are close to being unidentified; and Cattaneo et al. (2018) studies models where
possibly many covariates are included for estimation and inference.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We analyze a novel model of competition between agents. A variable of interest is
related to a vector of covariates. Agents have different models of these relationship: in
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particular they rule in/ rule out different xs as being potentially related to prediction.
All agents observe a common dataset of size n, drawn from the true data generating
process. The winner is the agent with the lowest expected loss, expectations taken
with respect to their own subjective posterior. This winner corresponds to the winner
under a stylized auction model we formally define and analyze, but may also be of
interest more generally in situations where subjective confidence in predictions lead
to selection. We study the relationship between the true data generating process and
the model of the winner, and how this relationship changes as a size of the available
dataset, n. We show results of two kinds.
First, when n is small, ‘simple’ models, i.e., models that employ few observables,
may take the lead, even if the true data generating process is rich. This follows
from our characterization of the (subjective) expected loss. To establish this result
formally, we used a ‘drifting’ Normal-Inverse Gamma prior; where we allowed the
elasticity of the prior density with respect to the variance to increase with the sample
size.
Second, when n is large, the winner is qualitatively similar to the model with the
lowest value of the Akaike Information Criterion. Misspecified models (i.e., models
that rule out an observable which is relevant for prediction) never win, but overly
large models may continue to win even as data grows unboundedly large. The prior
is not completely ‘washed out’ by the large sample. The elasticity of the prior density
with respect to the variance parameter continues to affect the model competition even
with infinite data. This result is established for a very general class of priors and true
data generating processes.
There are several natural avenues to future research. An obvious one is a setting
in which agents each observe a private dataset: this complicates our analysis because
now a notion of the winner’s curse applies. Each agent must consider whether they
are beating the others because their model is truly performing well on the data,
or because their dataset is non-representative. Another one is to consider dynamic
variants: if agents got feedback or could invest to acquire more data, what kinds of
models would be selected?
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A Main Appendix
A.1 Second-price auction
Consider a second-price auction, where, like in Atakan and Ekmekci (2014), the win-
ner of the auction gets to choose an action that affects the value of the asset. Specifi-
cally, the action has a value that depends on her ability to predict a given variable, as
in the examples given in the introduction. Formally, fixing the environment defined
above (DGP, agents etc), consider a game with the following timing:
1. Nature draws θ ∈ Θ;
2. All agents see a common dataset Dn drawn according to Qθ;
3. Agents submit bid in a sealed-bid second-price auction;
4. The winner observes x randomly drawn according to P and chooses an real-
values action a;
5. The winner gets a lump sum payoff of M − (y−a)2, where M is a large positive
number.
Every bidder seeks to minimize the expected value M − (y − a)2, leading to the
expected loss function discussed above.
Because agents see a common data set, an agent with prior pi has an expected value
of M − L∗(pi,Dn) for winning. In the standard dominant equilibrium, the winning
agent is the one with the highest value: since M is common across agents, the winner
is thus the agent with the lowest expected loss (according to her own prior) given
the observed data. Notice that since all agents observe the same dataset, and thus
there is no asymmetric information (only heterogenous priors), winner’s-curse-type
considerations do not apply.15
15Our results possibly shed light on political competition/ board meetings. While we do not
develop these formally, intuitively, these would correspond to an analogous all-pay auction. Agents
have different models of how to forecast payoff-relevant unknowns from observables. The action
taken (by the government body or company) depends on this forecast. Agents’ willingness to lobby
for their model depends on how confident they are in their model, and the amount of effort they
spend lobbying influences selection.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Fix a data set Dn. We need to analyze
Epi
[
EP
[
(x′β − f ∗(pi,Dn)(x))2
]∣∣∣Dn] .
Substituting f ∗ from (4), we have that this term
=Epi
[
EP
[
((β − Epi[β|Dn])′x)2
]∣∣∣Dn] .
Recalling that for a scalar a, a = Tr(a), we have
=Epi
[
EP
[
Tr[((β − Epi[β|Dn])′x)2]
]∣∣∣Dn] ,
and then by symmetry and linearity of the trace operator, we can conclude,
=Epi
[
EP
[
Tr[(β − Epi[β|Dn])(β − Epi[β|Dn])′xx′]
]∣∣∣Dn] ,
=Epi
[
Tr[(β − Epi[β|Dn])(β − Epi[β|Dn])′EP [xx′]]
∣∣∣Dn] ,
=Tr
[
Epi
[
(β − Epi[β|Dn])(β − Epi[β|Dn])′
∣∣∣Dn]EP [xx′]].
Finally, by the definition of variance, we have the desired form
=Tr(Vpi(β|Dn)EP [xx′]]. 
A.3 Generalization and Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we proof Theorem 1 under a set of less restrictive assumptions. Instead
of requiring the prior pi to be infinitely differentiable, we only require it to be six times
differentiable.
Assumption 3. Each agent has a prior over θ characterized by a six times con-
tinuously differentiable, and strictly positive probability density function pi(·) over
(βJ(pi)
′, σ2 )
′ ∈ R|J(pi)| × R+.
We also relax the assumption that the true DGP is a linear regression model.
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Assumption 4. Let P denote the joint distribution of (x, y). Let the data Dn :=
((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) denote an i.i.d. sample from P. Then:
1. The smallest eigenvalue of the matrix EP[xx′] is strictly positive
2. (x, y) have finite moments of all orders.
3. Let J(pi) denote the subset of explanatory variables considered relevant under
a prior pi satisfying Assumption 3. Let β∗(pi) the coefficient of the best linear
predictor for y based on xJ(pi) and let σ∗2(pi) ≡ EP[(y−x′J(pi)β∗(pi))]. We assume
that the condition (2.3) of Kleijn and Van der Vaart (2012) holds at θ∗(pi) ≡
(β∗(pi), σ∗(pi)).
Part (1) guarantees that the matrix of population second moments is both finite
and invertible. This implies there is a unique parameter β0 satisfying EP[x(y−x′β0)] =
0 and we interpret it as the true parameter.16 Part (2) will be used to invoke a
standard Central Limit Theorem for the asymptotic distribution of the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimator in a linear regression model.17 Part (3) can be thought of
as imposing the Bernstein-Von Mises Theorem (BVMT) for misspecified models.18
We are now ready to state and prove our more general theorem. Theorem 1 follows
trivially because it makes strictly stronger assumptions.
Theorem 3. Let Π be a finite collection of agents’ priors that satisfy Assumption 3.
Suppose the true data generating process P satisfies Assumption 4. Define β0 as the
parameter such that EP[x(y − x′β0)] = 0. Let J0 denote the associated true model for
16This also implies that the population second moments can be consistently estimated from the
sample second moments of the data. We will use this assumption to characterize the probability
limit of the Maximum Likelihood Estimators based on the possibly misspecified likelihoods of the
Bayesian agents. Note that in principle, we allow for the distribution of covariates assumed by the
competing agents (denoted P ) to be different from the distribution of covariates under P.
17We will use this assumption to characterize the asymptotic distribution of the difference in
model fit for models that are larger than the true model. This assumption allows for conditional
heteroskedasticity of regression residuals.
18If we assume that the agents’ DGP is a correctly specified parametric statistical model, the
BVMT implies that the posterior distribution of a parameter θ is approximately Normal, centered
at the maximum likelihood estimator. A similar result is available for misspecified models; see Bunke
and Milhaud (1998) and Kleijn and Van der Vaart (2012). Instead of imposing the BVMT theorem
for misspecified models as a high-level assumption (as, for example, Condition 1 in Müller (2013))
we only assume condition (2.3) of Kleijn and Van der Vaart (2012).
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β0. If Π contains a prior pi0 such that J0 ⊆ J(pi0), then
lim
n→∞
P
(
∃pi ∈ argmin
pi∈Π
L∗(pi,Dn) s.t J0 ⊆ J(pi)
)
= 1
Moreover, for any pi for which J0 ⊂ J(pi)
lim
n→∞
P(L∗(pi,Dn) < L∗(pi0, Dn)) ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Lemma 1 has shown that the posterior loss for an agent with prior pi is
L∗(pi,Dn) = Epi[σ2|Dn] + tr(Vpi(βJ(pi)|Dn)EP [xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]).
Lemma 2 shows that under parts (1)-(2) of Assumption 4, the first term in the
posterior loss, Epi[σ2|Dn], admits the following Kass et al. (1990) expansion:
σ
∧2(pi)− 1
n
(
2σ∗4(pi)
{(
∂pi
∂σ2
(θ∗(pi))
)
· 1
pi(θ∗(pi))
}
− σ∗2(pi)(|J(pi)|+ 4)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡F (pi)
+oP
(
1
n
)
,
(8)
where σ
∧2(pi) denotes the Maximum Likelihood estimator of σ2 according to the linear
regression model with covariates J(pi). The parameter θ∗(pi) is defined as in Part (3)
of Assumption 4.
The likelihood of the linear regression model with covariates XJ(pi) satisfy the
stochastic local asymptotic normality condition in equation (2.1) of Kleijn and Van der
Vaart (2012) at θ∗ ≡ θ∗(pi) = (β∗(pi), σ∗2(pi)).19 Therefore, Part (3) of Assumption 4
implies that Theorem 2.1 in Kleijn and Van der Vaart (2012) holds and consequently
the model uncertainty term equals
19Algebra shows the condition is satisfied with
Vθ∗ ≡
(EP[xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]
σ2(pi) 0
0 12σ2(pi) ,
)
,
∆n,θ∗ ≡ V −1θ∗
(
1
σ∗2(pi)
1√
n
∑n
i=1 xJ(pi),i(yi − x′J(pi),iβ∗(pi))
1
σ∗4(pi)
1√
n
∑n
i=1(yi − x′J(pi),iβ∗(pi))2 − σ∗2(pi).
)
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σ2(pi)
n
tr
(
EP[xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]−1EP [xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]
)
+ oP
(
1
n
)
.
This means that for any two models pi, pi′ we have
L∗(pi,Dn)− L(pi′, Dn) = σ
∧2(pi)− σ∧2(pi′) +OP
(
1
n
)
.
Take pi to be the prior of an agent that excludes some relevant explanatory variable;
that is J0 6⊆ J(pi). Take pi′ to be the prior pi0 of any agent that includes all relevant
explanatory variables; that is J0 ⊆ J(pi0) (such an agent exists by assumption). The
difference in posterior loss is eventually strictly positive. This follows from the well-
known fact that the probability limit of the difference
σ
∧2(pi)− σ∧2(pi0),
is strictly positive (under our assumptions, the misspecified model has strictly larger
residual variance than the true model). This shows that
lim
n→∞
P
(
∃pi ∈ argmin
pi∈Π
L∗(pi,Dn) s.t J0 ⊆ J(pi)
)
= 1.
For the last part of the theorem, take pi to be an agent with a prior piL that
includes all relevant explanatory variables, but includes some irrelevant variables;
that is J0 ⊂ J(piL).
P(L∗(piL, Dn) < L∗(pi0, Dn)) = P(n(L∗(pi0, Dn)− L∗(piL, Dn)) > 0)
= P
(
n(σ
∧2(pi0)− σ
∧2(piL)) > (F (pi0)− F (piL)) + oP(1)
)
,
where we have used the Kass et al. (1990) expansion in (8). Standard algebra of
linear regression—e.g., Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 in Greene (2003)—shows that
under Part (2) of Assumption 4
n(σ
∧2(pi0)− σ
∧2(piL))
d→ ζ,
where ζ is an absolutely continuous real-valued random variable supported on the
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positive part of the real line.20 This shows that
lim
n→∞
P(L∗(pi,Dn) < L∗(pi0, Dn)) ∈ (0, 1]. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Denote the single datapoint as D1 = (Y,X), where Y ∈ R and X ∈ R1×k (k
is the number of covariates), and X = x′. First, observe that for any agent j with a
single explanatory variable κ in his model (denoted xκ). By Lemma 3
L∗(pij, D1) =
b0 +
1
2
(
y2 − y2x2κ
x2κ+γ
)
a0 − 12
(
1 +
1
x2κ + γ
)
,
=
b0 +
1
2
y2γ
x2κ+γ
a0 − 12
(
1 +
1
x2κ + γ
)
.
The winning agent among the single variable models will therefore clearly be the
agent with the variable κ that maximizes xκ. Without loss of generality, call this
variable 1.
To economize on notation, now consider the full model with all the explanatory
variables, it will be clear from the logic that this argument will work for any model
larger than a single variable. For an agent j with all k variables, we know that
L∗(pij, D1) =
b0 +
y2
2
(1−X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′)
a0 − 12
(
1 + Tr
[
(X ′X + γkIk)−1
])
.
To show that this model always loses, we need to show that this model’s loss is always
20In particular,
ζ ≡ ξ′[R(EP[xJ(piL)x′J(piL)])−1R′]−1ξ/σ20 ,
where
ξ ∼ N|J(piL)−J(pi0)|(0, REP[(y − x′β0)2(xJ(piL)x′J(piL))−1]R′).
In this notation, R is the |J(piL)−J(pi0)| × |J(piL)| matrix that selects the entries of βJ(piL) that are
zero under the model specified by pi0 and |J | denotes the cardinality of the set J .
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larger than the “best” single variable model. To do this, it is sufficient to show that:
(1−X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′) ≥ γ
x21 + γ
,
Tr
[
(X ′X + γkIk)−1
]
≥ 1
x21 + γ
.
We will handle each of these separately. Let’s start with the second. Recall that for
any matrix A, Tr(A) equals the sum of eigenvalues of A. Further, the eigenvalues
of A−1 are the reciprocals of the eigenvalues of matrix A for an invertible matrix.
Finally if A is positive definite, all the eigenvalues are strictly positive.
By the Gershgorin circle theorem (see e.g. Theorem 6.1.1 of Horn and Johnson
(1990)), all the eigenvalues of a matrix A lie within
⋃k
κ=1[aκ,κ −Rκ, aκ,κ +Rκ] where
Rκ is the sum of the absolute values of the non-diagonal terms on row κ, and aκ,κ is
the κ diagonal element.
Consider the matrix (X ′X+γkIk). Observe thatRκ in this case = |xκ|(
∑
κ′ 6=κ |xκ′ |),
while aκ,κ = x2κ + kγ. Therefore the largest possible eigenvalue is |x1|(
∑
κ |xκ|) + kγ,
which in turn is small than k(x21 + γ).
Therefore for the matrix (X ′X + γkIk)−1, all eigenvalues are larger than 1k(x21+γ) ,
and therefore the sum of eigenvalues is at least 1
(x21+γ)
(since there are k eigenvalues)!
We can therefore conclude that
Tr
[
(X ′X + γkIk)−1
]
≥ 1
x21 + γ
,
as desired.
We are left to prove that:
(1−X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′) ≥ γ
x21 + γ
,
⇐⇒ X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′ ≤ x
2
1
x21 + γ
.
Now, observe that X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′ is a scalar. We know that for a scalar,
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a = Tr(a). Therefore we have that
X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′,
=Tr[X(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′],
=Tr[(X ′X + γkIk)−1X ′X],
=Tr[(
1
γk
X ′X + Ik)−1
1
γk
X ′X].
Denote 1
γk
X ′X as A. Substituting
=Tr[(A+ Ik)−1A].
Now, observe that if λ is an eigenvalue of A, then λ
1+λ
is an eigenvalue of (A+ Ik)−1A.
To see this, suppose v is an eigenvector of A with eigenvalue λ. Then,
Av = λv,
=⇒ (A+ Ik)v = (λ+ 1)v,
=⇒ (A+ Ik)−1v = 1
1 + λ
v,
=⇒ (A+ Ik)−1Av = λ
1 + λ
v.
Substituting this in, we have
Tr[(A+ Ik)−1A] =
k∑
i=1
λi
1 + λi
.
Therefore we are left to show that
k∑
i=1
λi
1 + λi
≤ x
2
1
x21 + γ
Here λi’s are the eigenvalues of 1γkX
′X. This implies that
∑
i λi =
1
γk
∑
i x
2
i .
Note that X ′X is not full rank, indeed, its null space is of dimension k − 1.
Therefore it has k − 1 multiplicity eigenvalue of 0. The unique non-zero eigenvalue
must then be 1
γk
∑
i x
2
i .
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Substituting in, we have
k∑
i=1
λi
1 + λi
=
1
γk
∑
i x
2
i
1
γk
∑
i x
2
i + 1
,
=
1
k
∑
i x
2
i
1
k
∑
i x
2
i + γ
,
≤ x
2
1
x21 + γ
.
where the last inequality follows since we assumed that x21 = maxi{x2i : 1 ≤ i ≤
k}. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. It is well known that for a prior pi in the Normal-Inverse Gamma family:
Vpi[βJ(pi)|Dn] = Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
(X ′J(pi)XJ(pi) + γ|J(pi)|I|J(pi)|)−1,
= Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
] 1
n
(
X ′J(pi)XJ(pi)
n
+
γ|J(pi)|I|J(pi)|
n
)−1
.
Under the Assumptions on P in Theorem 2
(
X ′J(pi)XJ(pi)
n
+
γ|J(pi)|I|J(pi)|
n
)−1
= EP[xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]−1 + oP(1).
Consequently,
Tr
(
Vpi[βJ(pi)|Dn]EP[xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]
)
= Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
](J(pi)
n
+ oP
(
1
n
))
.
It follows from algebra that for any priors pi, pi′ in the Normal-Inverse Gamma family
L∗(pi′, Dn) > L∗(pi,Dn)
⇐⇒ (Epi [σ2 |Dn]− Epi′ [σ2 |Dn])(1 + J(pi′)n + oP
(
1
n
))
> Epi[σ2 |Dn]
(
J(pi)− J(pi′)
n
)
.
It is well known that for a prior pi in the Normal-Inverse Gamma family, the
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posterior mean of βJ(pi) is the ‘Ridge estimator’
β
∧
pi := (X
′
J(pi)XJ(pi) + γ|J(pi)|IJ(pi))−1X ′J(pi)y,
which solves the problem
min
β∈R|J(pi)|
(y −XJ(pi)β)′(y −XJ(pi)β) + (γ|J(pi)|) ||β||2
First, consider two priors pi, pi′ such that J(pi′) ⊂ J(pi), and J(pi′) = J0. In a
slight abuse of notation let β
∧
pi′ denote the vector in RJ(pi) with all the coordinates in
J(pi)\J(pi′) equal to zero. Also, let J be used to abbreviate J(pi).
Equation (6) implies that for any such two priors pi, pi′
n(Epi′ [σ2 |Dn]− Epi[σ2 |Dn])
is proportional to the sum of
(y −XJβ
∧
pi′)
′(y −XJβ
∧
pi′)− (y −XJβ
∧
pi)
′(y −XJβ
∧
pi) (9)
and
γ
(
|J(pi′)| ||β
∧
pi′ ||2 − |J | ||β
∧
pi||2
)
. (10)
where the proportionality constant is cn := (2a0/n+ 1− 2/n)−1.
Algebra shows that the expression in (9) equals
−2(y −XJβ
∧
pi)
′XJ(β
∧
pi′ − β
∧
pi) + (β
∧
pi − β
∧
pi′)
′X ′JXJ(β
∧
pi − β
∧
pi′)
and the expression in (10)
γ|J(pi′)|(β
∧
pi − β
∧
pi′)
′(β
∧
pi − β
∧
pi′)− γ(|J | − |J(pi′)|)β
∧′
piβ
∧
pi + 2γ|J(pi′)|β
∧′
pi(β
∧
pi′ − β
∧
pi).
The first-order conditions defining the Ridge estimator imply
−2(y −XJβ
∧
pi)
′XJ + 2γ|J |β
∧′
pi = 0.
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Therefore, in any finite sample
n(Epi′ [σ2 |Dn]− Epi[σ2 |Dn]) =cn
(
(β
∧
pi − β
∧
pi′)
′(X ′JXJ + γ|J(pi′)|IJ)(β
∧
pi − β
∧
pi′)
+ γ(|J | − |J(pi′)|)β
∧′
piβ
∧
pi − 2γ(|J | − |J(pi′)|)β
∧′
pi′β
∧
pi
)
.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 and recalling that J(pi′) = J0,
=OP(1).
However, under the same assumptions
Epi[σ2 |Dn] =
2bn
n
+ oP(1).
Since bn ∈ ω (n2), the previous term diverges to infinity. This implies
P
(
n(Epi′ [σ2 |Dn]− Epi[σ2 |Dn])
(
1 +
J(pi′)
n
+ oP(1)
)
> Epi[σ2 |Dn])(J(pi)− J(pi′))
)
converges to zero. We conclude that J(pi) ⊃ J(pi′) = J0 implies
P[L∗(pi,Dn) < L∗(pi′, Dn)]→ 0.
Now instead consider the same framework as above, but let pi now be such that
J(pi) = J0 and |J(pi′)| < |J(pi)]. The probability that the smaller model, pi′, is
defeated by pi is
P
(
(Epi′ [σ2 |Dn]− Epi[σ2 |Dn])
(
1 +
J(pi′)
n
+ oP(1)
)
>
Epi[σ2 |Dn])
n
(J(pi)− J(pi′))
)
.
Under the assumptions of the theorem
(Epi′ [σ2 |Dn]− Epi[σ2 |Dn]) = OP(1).
However,
Epi[σ2 |Dn])
n
=
bn
n2
+ oP
(
1
n
)
.
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Since bn ∈ ω (n2) , the latter diverges as n grows large. We conclude that:
P[L∗(pi′, Dn) < L∗(pi,Dn)]→ 1.
The result follows. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose the known variance of  is σ2 . Then for any agent with prior pi, upon
seeing data Dn, the posterior expected loss evaluates to:
L∗(pij, Dn) = σ2 + Tr(Vpi[β|Dn]),
where we have assumed that Ep[xx′] = I.
Without loss of generality, suppose the larger model J ′ is the entire set of ob-
servables of size k. We need to show that there exists a model J of size |J | such
that
Tr(X ′X + γkIk)−1 ≥ Tr(X ′JXJ + γ|J |I|J |)−1.
In particular let J be such that
∑
j∈J ej(X
′X+γkIk)−1ej ≤
∑
j∈J ′′ ej(X
′X+γkIk)−1ej
for any J ′′ such that |J ′′| = |J | . Then, it must be the case that
Tr(X ′X + γkIk)−1 ≥ k|J |
∑
j∈J
ej(X
′X + γkIk)−1ej.
Therefore it is sufficient to show that for this model J , we have
k
|J |
∑
j∈J
ej(X
′X + γkIk)−1ej ≥ Tr(X ′JXJ + γ|J |I|J |)−1.
Without loss we can renumber the indices so that J = {1, 2, . . . , |J |}. Let L denote
the set of remaining indices, i.e. L = {|J | + 1, . . . , k}. We can thus write the left
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hand size of the inequality as:
k
|J |
∑
j∈J
ej
(
X ′JXJ + γkI|J | X ′JXL
X ′LXJ X
′
LXL + γkI|L|
)−1
ej.
Using the standard formula for block inverse of a matrix we can write this as
=
k
|J |
∑
j∈J
ej
(
A1 A2
A3 A4
)−1
ej.
where A1 = (X ′JXJ + γkI|J | −X ′JXL(X ′LXL + γkI|L|)−1X ′LXJ)−1. Substituting that
in we have
=
k
|J |Tr(X
′
JXJ + γkI|J | −X ′JXL(X ′LXL + γkI|L|)−1X ′LXJ)−1.
Therefore, taking k|J | to the other side, we are left to show that
Tr(X ′JXJ + γkI|J | −X ′JXL(X ′LXL + γkI|L|)−1X ′LXJ)−1 ≥ Tr(
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkI|J |)−1
(11)
Next, given 4 matrices A,B,C, and D where A and C are invertible, it is easy to show
that
(A+BCD)−1 = A−1 − A−1B(C−1 +DA−1B)DA−1.
Suppose we define
A = X ′JXJ + γkI|J |,
B = −X ′JXL,
C = (X ′LXL + γkI|L|)−1,
D = X ′LXJ .
Note that in this case, A and C are invertible by observation. In light of this, and
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the linearity of the Trace operator, we can rewrite the left hand side of (11) as
Tr(A−1 − A−1B(C−1 +DA−1B)DA−1),
=TrA−1 − Tr(A−1B(C−1 +DA−1B)DA−1),
=Tr(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1 − Tr(A−1B(C−1 +DA−1B)DA−1),
where A,B,C and D are as defined above. So (11) can be written as:
Tr(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1 − Tr(A−1B(C−1 +DA−1B)DA−1) ≥ Tr(
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkI|J |)−1.
To show this inequality it is therefore sufficient to show that
Tr(A−1B(C−1 +DA−1B)DA−1) ≤ 0, (12)
Tr(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1 ≥ Tr(
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkIk)−1. (13)
We now show each of these in turn. Let us start with the first. Note that B = −D′
we have:
(12) ⇐⇒ Tr(A−1D′(C−1 −DA−1D′)DA−1) ≥ 0.
In turn, since A is symmetric, so is A−1, so defining Q ≡ A−1D′
⇐⇒ Tr(Q(C−1 −DA−1D′)Q′) ≥ 0.
Since QMQ′ is a positive semidefinite matrix if M is a positive semidefinite matrix
(see e.g. Observation 7.1.8 of Horn and Johnson (1990)), it is sufficient to show that
(C−1 − DA−1D′) is a positive semidefinite matrix (the trace of a matrix equals the
sum of all its eigenvalues, and the eigenvalues of a positive semidefinite matrix are
all non-negative). So to show (12), it is sufficient to show that (C−1 − DA−1D′) is
positive semidefinite. To see this, observe that:
(C−1 −DA−1D′),
=X ′LXL + γkI|L| −X ′LXJ(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1X ′JXL,
=X ′L
(
IN −XJ(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1X ′J
)
XL + γkI|L|.
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It is therefore sufficient to show that each of these two matrices are positive semidefi-
nite. The latter is positive definite by observation. To show that the former is positive
semidefinite, by another appeal to Observation 7.1.8 of Horn and Johnson (1990), it
is sufficient to show that
(
Ik −XJ(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1X ′J
)
is positive semidefinite. But
observe that:
Ik −XJ(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1X ′J ,
=Ik − 1
γk
XJ(
1
γk
X ′JXJ + I|J |)−1X ′J . (14)
Now, we know that for any square matrix P ,
(I+ P )−1 = I − (I+ P )−1P,
= I − P + (I+ P )−1P 2,
= I +
∞∑
j=1
(−1)jP j.
Substituting in P = 1
γk
X ′JXJ , we have that
XJ(
1
γk
X ′JXJ + I|J |)−1X ′J = XJ
(
I|J | −
∞∑
j=1
(− 1
γk
)j(X ′JXJ)
j
)
X ′J ,
= XJX
′
J −
∞∑
j=1
(− 1
γk
)j(XJX
′
J)
j+1,
= (XJX
′
J)(I|J | −
∞∑
j=1
(− 1
γk
)j(XJX
′
J)
j),
= (XJX
′
J)(I|J | +
1
γk
XJX
′
J)
−1.
Therefore we have that
(14) = Ik − 1
γk
(XJX
′
J)(I|J | +
1
γk
XJX
′
J)
−1,
= Ik − (XJX ′J)(γkI|J | +XJX ′J)−1,
= γk(γkI|J | +XJX ′J)−1.
which is positive definite by observation.
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We are left, then, to show (13), i.e. that:
Tr(X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1 ≥ Tr(
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkIk)−1,
⇐⇒ Tr((X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1 − (
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkIk)−1) ≥ 0.
Algebra shows
Tr((X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1 − (
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkIk)−1),
=Tr((X ′JXJ + γkI|J |)−1
(
k − |J |
|J | X
′
JXJ
)
(
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkIk)−1),
=Tr(
k − |J |
|J | XJ(X
′
JXJ + γkI|J |)−1(
k
|J |X
′
JXJ + γkIk)−1X ′J).
The final matrix into the trace operator is positive semidefinite by Observation 7.1.8
of Horn and Johnson (1990). 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For an agent with prior pi the agent’s ex-ante expected loss on seeing a dataset
of size n is
Em(pi)[L∗(pi,Dn)] =
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
∫
y,x
(y − x′β
∧
(Dn))
2dQθ(y, x)dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ).
The agents’ statistical model is y = x′β + ,  ∼ N (0, σ2)
=
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
∫
y,x
(x′β + − x′β
∧
(Dn))
2dQθ(x, )dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ),
=
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
∫
x,
((x′(β − β
∧
(Dn)))
2 + 2)dQθ(x, )dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ),
= Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
∫
x
(x′(β − β
∧
(Dn)))
2dQθ(x)dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ),
= Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
(∫
x
((β − β
∧
(Dn))
′xx′(β − β
∧
(Dn))dQθ(x)
)
dQθ(Dn)dpiJ(θ),
= EpiJ [σ
2
 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
((β − β
∧
(Dn))
′(β − β
∧
(Dn))dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ).
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Where the last equality follows since EP [xx′] = I by assumption. Now, since γ = 0 by
assumption, for dataset Dn = (Y,X), we have that β
∧
(Dn) = (X
′
J(pi)XJ(pi))
−1X ′J(pi)Y .
In a slight abuse of notation abbreviate J(pi) as J . Writing that Y = XJβ+ e, where
e is the n× 1 vector collecting i:
(β
∧
(Dn)− β) = (X ′JXJ)−1X ′Je.
Substituting back in we have that:
Em(pi)[L∗(pi,Dn)] = Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
((β − β
∧
(Dn))
′(β − β
∧
(Dn))dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ),
= EpiJ [σ
2
 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
(
e′XJ(X ′JXJ)
−1(X ′JXJ)
−1X ′Je
)
dQθ(Dn)dpi(θ),
and since e′XJ(X ′JXJ)−1(X ′JXJ)−1X ′Je is a scalar
= Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
Tr(e′XJ(X ′JXJ)
−1(X ′JXJ)
−1X ′Je)dQθ(Dn)dpiJ(θ).
Using the cyclic property of the trace operator,
= Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
∫
Dn
Tr((X ′JXJ)
−1X ′Jee
′XJ(X ′JXJ)
−1)dQθ(Dn)dpiJ(θ).
By assumption, XJ and e are independent and EQθ [ee′] = σ2 In. Thus,
= Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
σ2
∫
XJ
Tr((X ′JXJ)
−1X ′JXJ(X
′
JXJ)
−1)dQθ(XJ)dpiJ(θ),
= Epi[σ2 ] +
∫
θ=(β,σ2 )
σ2
∫
XJ
Tr(X ′JXJ)
−1dQθ(XJ)dpiJ(θ),
= Epi[σ2 ]
(
1 +
|J |
n− |J | − 1
)
.
The last equation follows because when x ∼ N (0, Ik), (X ′JXJ) is a Wishart distribu-
tionW(IJ , n). Thus, (X ′JXJ)−1 has an inverse wishart distribution and its expectation
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equals IJ/(n− |J | − 1), provided n > |J |+ 1. Finally
J ′
n− J ′ − 1 <
J
n− J − 1 ,
if and only if n > 1. Since Epi[σ2 ] is common across all agents by assumption, the
result follows. 
B Supplementary Material
B.1 Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Let pi be a prior satisfying Assumption 3. If P satisfies parts (1)-(2) of
Assumption 4, then Epi[σ2|Dn] admits the following Kass et al. (1990) expansion:
σ
∧2(pi)− 1
n
(
2σ∗4(pi)
{(
∂pi
∂σ2
(θ∗(pi))
)
· 1
pi(θ∗(pi))
}
− σ∗2(pi)(|J(pi)|+ 4)
)
+ oP
(
1
n
)
,
where θ∗(pi) = (β∗(pi), σ2∗(pi)) are defined as in Part (3) of Assumption 4.
Proof. The proof has two main steps. First, we introduce some additional notation.
Second, we invoke the results of Kass et al. (1990) and apply them to approximate
Epi[σ
2|Dn].
Step 0 (Notation for Maximum Likelihood Estimators): An agent with
prior pi only uses covariates with indices in J(pi), this agent’s posterior can be obtained
using the likelihood
f(Y |XJ(pi); βJ(pi), σ2) := 1
(2pi)n/2
1
σn
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(Y −XJ(pi)βJ(pi))′(Y −XJ(pi)βJ(pi))
)
.
One additional piece of notation. We define the scaled log-likelihood function for
an agent with prior pi as
hn(θ(pi)) :=
1
n
ln f(Y |XJ(pi); θ(pi)).
The (i, j) component of the matrix of second derivatives of hn(θ(pi)) with respect to
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θ(pi) (the Hessian of the scaled log-likelihood) will be denoted as hij(·). We omit
the dependence on n, unless confusion arises. The components of the inverse of the
Hessian will be written as hij(·). Finally, hrsj(·) denotes the partial derivative of hrs
with respect to the j-th component of θ(pi).
Step 1 (Asymptotic Expansions of posterior moments): Kass et al. (1990)
provide asymptotic expansions for posterior moments around the maximizer of the
likelihood used to compute the posterior.
In the linear regression model, Theorem 4 and 5 in Kass et al. (1990) imply that
for any prior pi satisfying Assumption 3, P satisfying parts (1)-(2) of Assumption 4,
and for any six-times differentiable positive real-valued function the posterior of g(θ)
can be expanded as
Epi[g(θ)|Dn] = g(θ
∧
(pi)) +
1
n
∑
1≤i,j≤dim(θ(pi))
(
∂g
∂θi
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
hij(θ
∧
(pi))
{(
∂pi
∂θj
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
·
1
pi(θ
∧
(pi))
− 1
2
∑
1≤r,s≤dim(θ(pi))
hrs(θ
∧
(pi))hrsj(θ
∧
(pi))

+
1
2n
∑
1≤i,j≤dim(θ(pi))
hij(θ
∧
(pi))
(
∂g
∂θiθj
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
+ OP
(
1
n2
)
.
See equation 2.6 in p. 481 of Kass et al. (1990).
Consider the positive function
g(θ(pi)) = g(βJ(pi), σ
2) = σ2.
Because
∂g
∂σ2
(θ
∧
(pi)) = 1 and
∂g
∂θi
(θ
∧
(pi)) = 0,
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for any i < |J(pi)|+ 1, the expansion above simplifies to
Epi[σ
2|Dn] = σ
∧2(pi) +
1
n
∑
1≤j≤|J(pi)|+1
h(|J(pi)|+1)j(θ
∧
(pi))
{(
∂pi
∂θj
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
·
1
pi(θ
∧
(pi))
− 1
2
∑
1≤r,s≤dim(θ(pi))
hrs(θ
∧
(pi))hrsj(θ
∧
(pi))

+OP
(
1
n2
)
.
Moreover, the Hessian matrix of hn(θ(pi)) equals(
−1
nσ2
XJ(pi)
′XJ(pi) − 1nσ4XJ(pi)′(Y −XJ(pi)′βJ(pi))
− 1
nσ4
(Y −XJ(pi)′βJ(pi))′XJ(pi) 12σ4 − 1nσ6 (Y −XJ(pi)′(Y −XJ(pi)),
)
and the inverse Hessian evaluated at θ
∧
(pi) is(
−σ∧2(pi) (XJ(pi)′XJ(pi)/n)−1 0
0 −2σ∧4(pi),
)
This further simplifies the expansion to
Epi[σ
2|Dn] = σ
∧2(pi)− 2σ
∧4(pi)
n
{(
∂pi
∂σ2
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
· 1
pi(θ
∧
(pi))
− 1
2
∑
1≤r,s≤|J(pi)+1|
hrs(θ
∧
(pi))hrs(|J(pi)|+1)(θ
∧
(pi))
+OP
(
1
n2
)
.
Finally, the terms hr(|J(pi)|+1), h(|J(pi)|+1)s are both 0 for any r, s < |J(pi)|+ 1. Algebra
shows that
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∑
1≤r,s≤|J(pi)|+1
hrs(θ
∧
(pi))hrs(|J(pi)|+1)(θ
∧
(pi)) =
∑
1≤r,s≤|J(pi)|
hrs(θ
∧
(pi))hrs(|J(pi)|+1)(θ
∧
(pi))
+h(|J(pi)|+1)(|J(pi)|+1)(θ
∧
(pi)) ·
h(|J(pi)|+1)(|J(pi)|+1)(|J(pi)|+1)(θ
∧
(pi))
= −σ∧−2(pi)|J(pi)|
−4σˆ−2.
We conclude that the Kass-Tierney-Kadane expansion of Epi[σ2|Dn] equals
σ
∧2(pi)− 2σ
∧4(pi)
n
{(
∂pi
∂σ2
(θ
∧
(pi))
)
· 1
pi(θ
∧
(pi))
}
− σ∧2(pi) |J(pi)|+ 4
n
+OP
(
1
n2
)
. (15)
The result follows from the continuous differentiability of the prior and that Part (2)
of Assumption 4 imply
θ
∧
(pi) := (β
∧
(pi), σ
∧2(pi))
p→ θ∗(pi). 
B.2 Posterior Loss for Normal-Inverse Gamma Priors
We derive the specific formula of the posterior loss in the case of Normal-Inverse
Gamma priors.
Lemma 3. Suppose the agent has a Normal-Inverse gamma prior pi with hyper-
parameters (γ, a0, b0). Then, if the observed dataset is Dn = (y,X) we have that her
log posterior expected loss can be written as:
ln(L∗(pi,Dn)) = ln
(
2b0
n
+ 1
n
minβ∈R|J(pi)|
(
(y −XJ(pi)β)′(y −XJ(pi)β) + (γ|J(pi)|)||β||2
)
2a0
n
+ 1− 2
n
)
+ ln
(
1 + Tr
[(
(X ′J(pi)XJ(pi) + γ|J |I|J(pi)|
)−1 EP [xJ(pi)x′J(pi)]]) (16)
Proof. We break the proof into two steps. Step 1 shows provides an expression for
the posterior mean of σ2 . Step 2 plugs-in this expression into the formula for the
posterior loss.
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Step 1 First we show that the posterior mean of σ2 in a regression model with a
Normal-Inverse Gamma prior with hyperparameters (γ, a0, b0) is given by:
Epi[σ2 |Dn] =
2b0
n
+ 1
n
minβ∈Rk(y −Xβ)′(y −Xβ) + (γk) ||β||2
2a0
n
+ 1− 2
n
. (17)
It is known that
σ2 |Dn ∼ Inv-Gamma
(
a0 +
n
2
, b0 +
1
2
(y′y − β
∧′
R(γk)(X
′X + (γk)Ik)β
∧
R(γk))
)
.
where β
∧
R(γk) is the ridge estimator with penalty parameter γk. Since the mean of a
random variable distributed as Inv-Gamma(a, b) is b
a−1 , to show (6) it is sufficient to
show that:
min
β∈Rk
(y −Xβ)′(y −Xβ) + (γk) ||β||2 = y′y − β
∧
R(γk)
′(X ′X + (γk)Ik)β
∧
R(γk). (18)
To condense notation, let β
∧
R ≡ β
∧
R(λ), where λ = γk is fixed. Note that:
y′Xβ
∧
R =y
′X(X ′X + λIk)−1X ′y,
=y′X(X ′X + λIk)−1(X ′X + λIk)(X ′X + λIk)−1X ′y,
=β
∧′
R(X
′X + λIk)β
∧
R,
=β
∧′
RX
′Xβ
∧
R + λβ
∧′
Rβ
∧
R.
This implies that
(y −Xβ
∧
R)
′(y −Xβ
∧
R),
=y′y − 2y′Xβ
∧
R + β
∧′
RX
′Xβ
∧
R,
=y′y − β
∧′
RX
′Xβ
∧
R − 2λβ
∧′
Rβ
∧
R.
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Therefore:
y′y − β
∧′
R(X
′X + λIk)β
∧
R,
=y′y − β
∧′
R(X
′X)β
∧
R − λβ
∧′
Rβ
∧
R,
=(y −Xβ
∧
R)
′(y −Xβ
∧
R) + λβ
∧′
Rβ
∧
R.
Comparing, (18) follows, concluding our proof of (6).
Step 2 From Lemma 1, we have that the posterior loss
L∗(pi,Dn) = Epi[σ2 |Dn] +
∫ ∞
0
Tr(Vpi(β|Dn, σ2 )EP [xx′])pi(σ2 |Dn)dσ2 .
It is known that
Vpi(β|Dn, σ2 ) = σ2 (X ′X + (γk)Ik)−1,
This implies that
L∗(pi,Dn) =Epi[σ2 |Dn] +
∫ ∞
0
Tr(σ2 (X
′X + (γk)Ik)−1)EP [xx′])pi(σ2 |Dn)dσ2 ,
=Epi[σ2 |Dn] + Epi[σ2 |Dn]Tr((X ′X + (γk)Ik)−1Ep[xx′]).
Taking logs on both sides and using the formula for the posterior mean of σ2 from
Step 1, we obtain the desired formula. 
B.3 Posterior Loss for Normal-Inverse Gamma priors in large
samples
Observation 1. Suppose the agent has a Normal-Inverse Gamma prior. Then, for
n large, we have
ln (L∗(pi,Dn)) ≈ ln
(
Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Model Fit
+ ln
(
1 +
|J |
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Model Dimension
. (19)
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Proof. The posterior upon observing dataset Dn is
βJ |Dn, σ2 ∼ N|J |(β
∧
J,Ridge, σ
2
 (X
′
JXJ + (γ|J |)I|J |)−1),
=⇒ Vpi[βJ |Dn] = Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
(X ′JXJ + (γ|J |)I|J |)−1.
Therefore, substituting back, we have that
Tr (Vpi[βJ |Dn] EP [xJx′J ]) = Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
Tr
(
(X ′JXJ + (γ|J |)I|J |)−1 EP [xJx′J ]
)
,
= Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
Tr
(
1
n
(
1
n
(
X ′JXJ + (γ|J |)I|J |
))−1
EP [xJx′J ]
)
,
which for n large, by the law of large numbers
≈ Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
Tr
(
1
n
(EP [xJx′J ])
−1 EP [xJx′J ]
)
,
= Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
]
Tr
(
1
n
I|J |
)
,
= Epi
[
σ2 |Dn
] |J |
n
.
Thus for n large, (19) follows. 
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